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Abstract
Usually, Deleuze and Guattari's philosophies are understood as an alternative to allegedly  
“ressentiment”-laden approaches of Critical Theory. The present essay, however, seeks to distil  
Deleuze and Guattari's critical potential from an angle critical of post-critical endeavours. By bringing  
them together with two of their main influences, Nietzsche and Kafka, their concept of becoming gets  
connected to that of becoming-critical. The essay's orienting questions thus are (a) what  
understanding of critique is involved in Deleuze and Guattari's concept of becoming, and (b) how  
useful is it to address the political-economic dynamics of the 21st century? After “three anarchies” are  
traced as the critical potential in Deleuze and Guattari, Manfredo Tafuri helps to problematise their  
relationship with anarcho-capitalist ideologies, and to show how to differentiate them from each  
other. In between, affirmative immanence gets subverted in a Geistergespräch with the main  
philosopher of affirmation and anti-transcendental thought, Friedrich Nietzsche. Finally, the essay  
argues that, due to the world's state, affirmation can only be upheld if reconciled with critique:  
especially in times of crises, critique becomes necessary. At least if re-read together with Nietzsche  
and Kafka, a critique of what is murderous follows from the Deleuzian affirmation of life; as much as  
embracing the earth in a Guattarian manner necessitates to transcend the plane of (political)  
immanence. All in all, to whole-heartedly affirm singularity, as Deleuze and Guattari do, one needs to  
go beyond post-critique's resentments against utopia. 
Introduction
Usually, Deleuze and Guattari's philosophies are understood as an alternative to allegedly 
“ressentiment”-laden approaches of Critical Theory. Beyond this understanding, the present 
essay seeks to distil Deleuze and Guattari's critical potential from an angle critical of post-
critical endeavours. By bringing them together with two of their main influences, Nietzsche 
and Kafka, their concept of becoming gets connected to that of becoming-critical. The 
essay's orienting questions thus are (a) what understanding of critique is involved in Deleuze 
and Guattari's concept of becoming, and (b) how useful is it to address the political-
economic dynamics of the 21st century? We will concentrate our approach on close readings 
of the text “1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…” from A 
Thousand Plateaus. After “three anarchies” are traced as the critical potential in Deleuze and 
Guattari (I), Manfredo Tafuri helps to problematise their relationship with anarcho-capitalist 
ideologies, and to delineate how to differentiate them from each other (III). In between (II), 
affirmative immanence gets subverted in a Geistergespräch with the main philosopher of 
affirmation and anti-transcendental thought, Friedrich Nietzsche. Finally (V), the essay 
argues that, due to the world's state, affirmation can only be upheld if reconciled with 
critique: especially in times of crises, critique becomes necessary. At least if re-read together 
with Nietzsche and Kafka (IV), a critique of what is murderous follows from the Deleuzian 
affirmation of life; as much as embracing the earth in a Guattarian manner necessitates to 
transcend the plane of (political) immanence. All in all, to whole-heartedly affirm singularity, 
as Deleuze and Guattari do, one needs to go beyond post-critique's resentments against 
utopia. 
Regarding the style of the essay, a note may be helpful. Our attempt was to construct a 
textual collage which translates close reading directly into close writing. This textual 
contamination also allows to detach from some of Deleuze and Guattari's content precisely 
by pestering their wordings or conceptualisations. This double-move is one of taking their 
semantic material serious but rearranging it in the syntax of other found voices, like that of 
Nietzsche, Tafuri or Kafka. Generally, we have tried to stick to the conceptual toolkit given by 
Deleuze and Guattari, and this toolkit was sometimes used more and sometimes less strictly. 
In some occasions, our procedure resulted in a rag rug of text, in an almost too close 
reading, indeed in coming too close to a language that is that of an other, thereby becoming-
awkward (opening academic speak to minor literatures). At other times, the provocative 
approximation resulted in friction, and by deviating, specific problematisations and 
alternative readings could be developed. Hence, the alternation between these two uses of 
the given toolkit made it possible to haul out as much from Deleuze and Guattari – whereas 
it also demarcated where we needed to get beyond them to bring them nearer to some of 
their own consequences. In this manner, Nietzsche was consulted as the fiercest critic of 
Deleuze and Guattari exactly because he constantly lurks in their background. With this, we 
hope we could voice some harsher critiques without opening an unbridgeable line of 
confrontation. Indeed, the goal was to mutually contaminate diverging positions sufficiently 
enough to arrive at succinct results regarding the main topics. These ranged from critique 
and post-critique, transcendence and immanence, anarchy and capitalism to affirmation and 
negation, singularity and difference, utopia, becoming and (bare) life. The only danger of the 
method we applied may be a textual outcome too dense or too complex to be easily 
followed. Yet, we think that – at least when being able to count on some basic knowledge 
about Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy in the readers – this danger can be 
circumnavigated.       
I.
Outline of the Potential Critique Involved in D\G’s Notion of Becoming:
Three Anarchies
Let us start with an immanent reading of Deleuze and Guattari (from now on abbreviated as 
D\G1). To begin with, D\G.’s notion of becoming is critical towards what no longer becomes 
but what hinders, restricts or imprisons the production of differences. Yet, since becoming 
leads to the crisis (κρίσις) of the established, it is less the /notion/2 of becoming than 
becoming itself that is critical (κριτικός). In this way, D\G-becoming is a direct or unmediated 
critique of the Establishment. Such critique as becoming can be grasped less philosophically 
than as the pre-philosophic liberation of a κρίνειν or of “differentiating (from)”. Critique as 
differentiating from is an infinite flow of “Connect-I-cut”3, or of connecting and cutting. This 
“Connect-I-cut” entails, as will be elaborated in a bit, a critique of hierarchies because 
hierarchies cut without connecting; and a critique of identities because identities connect 
without cutting. Beyond both, already D\G.’s way of writing is less a description of becoming 
and its conditions than becoming itself4: following the lines of flight that become the 
pollution and “contagion”5 of non-identitarian and non-hierarchical differentiations (κρίνειν). 
What such creation of becoming engenders is an opening of grammars towards what D\G 
call x n event infinitive6, this is towards setting the ever-next new free again and again. In 
1Since Deleuze and Guattari's writings cannot be internally separated without separating what belongs 
together (perhaps “schizophrenically”), we will write about their literatures as of “one” kind of symbiotic 
multitude of differences: D\G. In the last paragraph of the essay, the use of the  “\” in  “D\G” will get a second 
twist.
2Cf. For the use of “//” in linguistics see Jameson 1991, 260.
3D\G 2012, 51.
4Cf. D\G 2003: “Singing or composing, painting, writing have no other aim: to unleash these becomings”. 
5Ibid., 239.
6Cf. 265.
short, D\G.’s critique is not a negative but an affirmative κρίνειν, a distinguishing from, a 
successive liberation, or proper becoming.
Since “[b]ecoming is a verb with a consistency all its own it does not reduce to, or lead back 
to, ‘appearing’, ‘being’, ‘equalling,’ or ‘producing’.”7 Proper becoming, thus, is a processual 
critique not only of that which has become and no longer becomes but of all which came 
just as a succession, inferred from its past, “fall[ing] back on something else, echo[ing] other 
forms.”8 Hence, most importantly, “[b]ecoming is never imitating”9: it cannot be found in the 
“mnemonic conditions of frequency and resonance”10, neither in history of philosophy nor in 
philosophy of history, nor indeed in any ideal of learning. Since “[b]ecoming is an 
antimemory”11, its creative practises go beyond memory and remembering. Instead of the 
capturing of time in thought12, becoming could be described as the release of thought as 
time into a kind of radically open future. Or as haunting futures without any foundationalist 
or determining Past but with a “presence of the poetic under the historical.”13 From this 
follows that D\G.’s philosophy is inevitably “transhistorical”14: it is a critique of Hegel's 
always belated wisdom of Minerva’s owl, and of all its collapse of freedom into necessity. 
Yet, if history up to now was prehistory (Marx), then becoming-transhistorical means to get 
outside of the continuum (Benjamin) of history. This quite non-immanent move reveals D\G 
as an an-archic intensity of implodings that explodes not only state apparatuses but any 
7239.
8271.
9305.
10293, cf. 294.
11294.
12Cf. Hegel 1964, 35. 
13Deleuze 2004, 130. 
14D\G 2003, 296.
security of secured or securitised (indebted) presents. As such, D\G are moving within the 
lines of flight of three an-archies, of (A), (B) and (C): 
– (A) They are an-archists with a pragmatist propagande par le fait not only infiltrating 
the state and Stasi but any stasis, static, or status quo. As already mentioned, this 
entails a critique (κριτικός) of hier-archies which, in the process, get flattened or 
resolve into the horizontality of a plane of immanence without top and bottom.
– (B) If the hierarchy that D\G are critical of is translated not just into “holy dominion” 
(ἱερ-αρχία) but gleichursprünglich into “holy origin” (ἱερ-αρχία), then D\G.’s 
becoming equals a crisis (κρίσις) already of the foundations of “the Church”. It does 
not matter, here, what the name of this church is, nor how much it poses as 
“secular”. In that sense, D\G may be described as post-anarchists15 whose 
undermining of the very idea of arché as origin dissolves both: sociological and 
naturalist legitimising tales (ideologies) of teleology, from progress to evolutionism. 
– With such an “anti-oedipal” move away from the father figure (Nietzsche's death of 
God), we have arrived at (C), or at the always-fleeing “\” (diagonal) D\G. This diagonal 
gets rid not only of God but of the want to belong to any church or, indeed, to any 
sect. In such a move, however, resides as infinite speed16 the micro-17 and trans-
political escape-route of D\G away from any policing Polis. This route is one of self-
differentiation or of κρίνειν.  
15Cf. Newman 2016.
16For “infinite speed” cf. esp. D\G 1994. 
17Cf. 2013, 243-270.
This existential exilism18 of constantly transgressing the borders and walls of poleis, of 
constant deterritorialisations, and thus of “attacks from the inside” is the most an-archic 
action of nomadology. With it, D\G are becoming-nomads, or barbarians from within. 
Following this line (of flight), their anti-statist “war machine”19 may be read critically as a 
radical (radix) crisis (κρίσις) infesting the very roots (radices)´of the family tree. By 
denucleating its trunk, D\G especially embrace (unlike Heidegger) becoming-plant and 
becoming-stone.20 It is meanwhile irrelevant to such infestation whether the family to infest 
has been abstracted into “nation” and “state”, or whether it holds its members captive 
within the abstract identities of sex, race, or species. 
At this point, the concrete anti-philosophy of D\G is becoming-virus in the system, 
becoming-vermin for the ideal State originating philosophically from Plato. In other words, 
D\G become, as becoming, a critiquing (κρίνειν) of totality and identity, of totality and 
identity whose idea and ideal is and remains the Polis (πόλις). The problem D\G have with 
the Polis, however, mirrored in Foucault’s introductory remarks on fascism in Anti-Oedipus, 
may best be grasped with Wilhelm Reich’s succinct view on the Polis, and thus on the 
realpolitik at hand: “Hitler as a political genius was a huge unmasking of the essence of the 
political in general. With Hitler, the political has reached the pinnacle of its development.”21 
If Reich was correct, plunging the Polis into crisis (κρίσις) qua barbarism from within – 
nomadology and deterritorialisation – is a radically anti-fascist move. All in all, since 
consistent anarchy subverts not only states, the status quo, hierarchies and their origins but 
18For “existential Territory” cf. Guattari 1995. 
19Cf. on “Nomadology” D\G 2013, 409-492.
20Cf. 275; and Heidegger 2010, where the ontologisation of Polis-hierarchies can be inspected at their most 
obvious. In Heidegger, man is “weltbildend”, the animal is “weltarm”, whilst both, the stone and the Jew, are 
“weltlos” (cf. Trawny 2014). Cf. furthermore Agamben 2003 and Derrida 2006 on the topic.   
21Reich 1971, 347. Of course, W. Reich has been of major influence on D\G (especially on their Anti-Oedipus).
also identities and their idealised totality (the “Polis”), the “an(ti)-poli(tic)s” of D\G can be 
called properly an- or anti-archic. 
In such a reading, the assemblage D\G is bursting with critique: not only with a critique of 
institutionalised politics but of all power politics, however microscopic they may be.22 This is 
the case because the Tree23 of the Polis has not only a trunk but a whole delta or radiation of 
off-shoots and spin-offs. More precisely, it is not the trunk but the branches and bifurcations 
that compose the Tree’s Crown – or its Monarchy. Hence, beyond D\G – or at least beyond 
the hegemonic interpretation of them –, monism (One-ism) is to be read as a metaphysics of  
Mon-archy (the rule of the One). Consequentially, an-archic monism is a contradictio in 
adiecto. This is because monism must conceptualise the ramifications of a Tree as its 
(dis-)solution, thereby remaining immanent or on the plane of Treeness, which thus 
commences “irradiating the entire universe”24. After all, the crown of a tree is not a rhizome. 
Its cosmology of fake-earth in heaven inhibits us from heaven on earth: the crown is an 
inverted set of roots. Rhizomes as practises of anti-archy need to strive not towards 
immersions in Treeness but towards differentiating from Trees' flat ramifications. The no-
body drowned in the Tree's delta is not the absence of ruling but its omni-presence. What 
an-archic practices need are not no-bodies but singularities. Singularities, however, are no 
agents of death drives. They cannot naively embrace their own loss as the freeing of 
nothingness. Rather, they want to live under their own rule. Singularity as that which is 
closest to the absence of ruling means to be able to rule over oneself.  
22Cf. D\G 2013, 243-270.
23Cf. on the Tree vs. the rhizome ibid., 1-28. 
24D\G 2003, 309
Unfortunately, D\G seem to “prefer not to”25 be able to rule over themselves. 
Consequentially, they seem to agitate for the rule of the no-body, the cosmology of 
immanence, the metaphysics of Monism. Such a strategy, however, is simply heterogenising 
Monarchy, bifurcating the trunk, quantifying the offshoots, unfolding the Tree crown. This 
reading of D\G is indeed not entirely un-grounded. Even more, it seems to be grounded in 
their plane of immanence: especially in the second half of “Becoming animal…” (in “A 
Thousand Plateaus”), D\G proclaim as desirable “to be like everybody else”, to “go 
unnoticed”26, this is: to become-nobody. In turn, this strategy explains why D\G may be said 
to end up where Badiou puts them: 
“Deleuze arrives at conceptual productions that I would unhesitatingly qualify as 
monotonous, composing a very particular regime of emphasis or almost infinite repetition 
of a limited repertoire of concepts, as well as a virtuosic variation of names, under which 
what is thought remains essentially identical.”27 
This may be so because D\G conceptualise “becoming on the same plane of pure 
immanence” – namely on a “pure plane of immanence […] upon which everything is given”28. 
The sameness and purity of immanence thus resembles a kind of speculative or spectacular 
neopositivism of givenness from which nothing and no one can hide or escape, and that no 
one can fight or transcend. Such neopositivism may eventually be inferred from D\G.’s 
metaphysically expressed realpolitik of a “[t]ranscendental empiricism […] which determines 
the conditions of real rather than possible experience”29. In effect, “Deleuze tends to 
25Cf. Beverungen/ Dunne 2007.
26D\G 2003, 279. 
27Clamor of Being cited in Bryant 2008, X. 
28D\G 2003, 255, our italics.
29Bryant 2008, 3. 
advocate a sort of fatalistic stoicism”30. The spectacular neopositivism of fatalistic stoicism, 
obviously, would radically call into question the an-archic stance of D\G. This an-archic 
stance is incompatible with a kind of naïve anarchism that reduces the political problem to 
the state and the family – forgetting about the growing, dynamic, emerging, becoming 
capitalist markets as realms of dominion. And indeed: “Nowhere, perhaps, is the field of 
immanence more manifest than in capitalism.”31 If D\G really just reproduce naïve anarchism 
on their plane of immanence, then only philosophic principles and ways of reasoning are 
subverted – instead of their contents, like f.e. the Hobbesian claim of fallen nature and man 
(from homo homini lupus to bellum omnium contra omnes). As a result, there would not be 
much left of D\G’s an-archic stance. Rather, their anti-Enlightenment, anti-humanist, anti-
Marxist propaganda of the deed could even border on French (and Italian) theories of 
fascism32 – some of which are retrieved by the aggressive anarcho-capitalism of our post-
welfare societies (like by figures such as Steve Fuller or Nick Land33).
Obviously, this reading of D\G is antipodal to the one we have arrived at above. Still, the 
present paper is not concerned with right or wrong but with critique and becoming. In the 
same book we just cited to support the second reading, there is a quote in which Deleuze 
states: “I am an empiricist, that is, a pluralist”.34 What this reveals is the not too surprising 
fact that there are at least two readings or two dimensions of D\G – a note that should not 
entice us to get lost in philosophical debates on which reading to prefer, nor in the 
respective ivory tower's architectures. Instead, after having spent some pages on elaborating 
30Ibid., 12; for the internal connection between capitalism and fatalism, cf. Tafuri 1976, 141.
31Zayani 2000, 102.
32Cf. Sternhell (et al.) 1994. 
33 On Fuller, see Omodeo 2019. 
34Dialogues cited in Bryant 263. 
the critical potential of D\G's becoming, in the following we mainly deal with the arguably 
uncritical in D\G. For taking seriously their self-critical self-“image” as pluralists, radicals, and 
anarchists demands criticising that which is potentially uncritical in their writings. And at the 
end of the day, not every self-contradiction is a line of flight. At least, some lines of flight end 
up in dead ends.  
II.
Transcending D\G: 
Becoming-Critical with a Nietzschean Ethics 
Non-critical theory's35 social function is to serve either as a protecting ideology or as the 
cultural engine of an avant-gardist paradigm shift.36 It is not hard to guess, then, what post-
critical or affirmative theory is about. How would D\G evaluate the rhizomatic team spirits of 
lean hierarchies, or the abundantly creative hyper-active event-intensities we know since the 
end of the 20th century? Are they not the result of capitalism? And is capitalism not itself an 
“immense abstract machine”37, a “real abstraction”38 – originally made of “English fabric”39? 
Isn't the “speedup of the abstract machine”40 identical to technological acceleration? If yes, 
can the anti-capitalist Deleuze really affirm capital's transgressive dis-embeddings (Polanyi) – 
35 For Critical Theory, by contrast, cf. Horkheimer 2011.
36To the most famous Marxist critiques mainly belong Jameson 1992, Eagleton 1996, 2003 and Žižek 1993. 
Polemically amusing remains Kurz 2013 (1999). Of major importance is: Boltanski/ Chiapello 2007; informed by 
them and of interest regarding Deleuze: Albertsen 2005.
37D\G 2003, 256.
38Sohn-Rethel 1977. 
39D\G 2003, 279.
40Ibid., 272.
or colonising (Habermas) deterritorialisations? Can an eco-philosopher like Guattari affirm 
an economic system to collapse the environment into its consuming immanence? 
In the reading proposed in chapter I, they can't. Their undifferentiated (uncritical)affirmative 
is in the way of their radically an-archic stance. Consequentially, in most of their writings, 
D\G insist that this world is not theirs. They know that “capitalist power has become 
delocalized and deterritorialized both in extension, by extending its influence over the whole 
social, economic and cultural life of the planet, and in ‘intension’, by infiltrating the most 
unconscious subjective strata.”41 Bearing such insights in mind, any critique of the uncritical 
in D\G must go beyond immanent affirmation in order not to betray the an-archic.
In what follows, the great “affirmer” himself – Nietzsche – will help us as an interlocutor 
with D\G.’s philosophy. In this Geistergespräch, /Nietzsche/ may transcend Deleuze’s re-
writings of Nietzsche et la philosophie. This procedure will unfold, instead of a reproduction 
of Deleuze’s Nietzsche, a Nietzsche exactly unlike Deleuze’s (although partially close to D\G). 
In fact, any other approach would allow no interlocutions but, say, only schizo-solipsist 
monologues on the monotonous – monist – plane of immanence. Apart from that, we resist 
to ruminate a persiflage of Nietzsche reduced to his least alive and least becoming concepts 
– like the “eternal return” or the “will to power”. We resist it mainly because Nietzsche's 
creative yet critical, indeed polemical style demands to read him against the current (instead 
of academically).42 
41Guattari 2014, 33. 
42Surely, Deleuze did read Nietzsche against the current when he wrote Nietzsche et la Philosophie. 
Nonetheless, his former intervention has meanwhile become a canonic authority, being transformed into a 
catechism especially via the influence of Foucault in the humanities. The effects of Deleuze introducing his 
Nietzsche to French philosophy – further igniting poststructuralism – cannot be overestimated. Since then, it is 
mainly the “third” or late Nietzsche who is studied and known, which underrepresents especially the “second” 
or intermediate Nietzsche of crisis (κρίσις) and of critique (from Human, All Too Human to Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra – books that are beyond the catchwords of academic recycling). Deleuze called this second phase 
“the age of the lion” (Deleuze 2001, 57) – see the penultimate chapter on how we deal with this concept of 
Nietzschean camel, lion, and child. 
Having said enough about that, for Nietzsche, becoming for becoming‘s sake – becoming 
stuck in becoming; or some kind of willing all, indiscriminately – would have been as empty 
as its opposite, as nihilism or the “will to nothing”.43 In fact, Nietzsche was an intensity of 
becoming not due to the stimulations of abstract concepts, systems or drugs (in these 
concerns he was an ascetic) but due to his sober affirmation of life. Such affirmation can only 
dwell in the living becoming of embodiment. The concept of the body as life’s “great 
health”44, however, encompasses not only intensity, creativity, movement and implosion. 
Rather, it also includes suffering, silence, solitude and distance. Since concrete life, seen 
from the angle of the all-constraining imperative of perfected idealism, is failure, what 
Nietzsche’s “body” and D\G affirm together, is life as essentially non-essential, confusing, 
and imperfect.45 On the other hand, in Nietzsche (as in Marx), this affirmation is linked to a 
“philosophy of suspicion” (Ricœur). Nietzsche's suspicion, however, is – next to that against 
theologians and “pure metaphysician[s]”46 – a suspicion against the “way too many”47. This 
“good taste”48 of those who are the (self-acclaimed) best (ἄριστοι) is summarised in 
Nietzsche’s always maintained esprit he himself called “pathos of distance”49. Whereas D\G 
43“Wille zum Nichts”, see Nietzsche’s Genealogie der Moral, last paragraph. All Nietzschean citations are 
translated by the author and can be found freely in the original (edited by Colli and Montinari) on 
http://www.nietzschesource.org/. Since I use this source, too, the paper’s citation style for Nietzsche will differ 
slightly from the other footnotes.  
44“Große Gesundheit“, see Nietzsche’s Fröhliche Wissenschaft (Gay Science), § 382.
45Cf. D\G 2003, 269
46Somers-Hall 2013, 1. 
47“Die Viel-zu-Vielen“, in Also Sprach Zarathustra’s chapter Vom neuen Götzen („About the new idol“).  
48For “guter Geschmack“ (good taste) in Nietzsche, see especially Fröhliche Wissenschaft (Gay Science) and 
Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil) – in the latter f.e. §§ 216-245, within which Nietzsche uses 
his notion of “Geschmack” 15 times. 
49“Pathos der Distanz“, see f.e. Der Anti-Christ § 43 and § 57. Importantly, „pathos” literally translated means 
suffering and bearing: this will become especially telling when we deal with Nietzsche’s concept of “the child” 
(including “the camel”) that is quite differently conceptualised than in D\G. 
identify “pack affects” with becoming itself50, for Nietzsche, they belong to a re-actionary 
slave morality with all its concomitant “ressentiments” leading, eventually, into the end of 
becoming as “der letzte Mensch”.51 Against this arch enemy, Nietzsche famously proclaimed 
the antipode to the last man as the Übermensch. If carefully read, this “Übermensch” is not 
to be confused with a trans-humanist super-man but rather delineates a living being that 
becomes as being overcoming (überwindend – transcending also D\G.’s “devenir”). At this 
point it gets clear what the main difference between Nietzsche and D\G is: it is the role of 
transcendence and negativity; the role of that which lies outside of what already is.  
Nietzsche’s critical pathos differentiates what to be affirmed not only quantitatively but 
normatively – even wertesetzend. He is definitely for becoming-animal but not for becoming 
sheep, dogs, or swarms – and rather for becoming serpent or lion.52 With Nietzsche, 
affirmation is no longer that of any and all becoming but of the very special singular living 
being that oneself is – it is the affirmation of “becoming what one is”53; the becoming of 
singularity. Such a more differentiating, more critical notion of becoming transcends the 
position of “being for any and all becoming”; it transcends the indistinguishability of the 
absolute54, asking instead: which becoming; the becoming of what? The Nietzschean ethics 
that is involved in the transcending pathos of distance, thus, is transcending D\G's becoming 
of immanence. Indeed, it is a pathos entirely negative about D\G.'s becoming as “find[ing] 
50D\G 2003, 246 and 240ff. It is important to stress that D\G can also be read with Nietzsche in these respects: 
“Majority implies a state of domination, not the reverse.” (Ibid., 291.) They go on to argue: “all becoming is a 
becoming-minoritarian” (286), for “only a minority is capable of serving as the active medium of becoming, but 
under such conditions that it ceases to be a definable aggregate in relation to the majority.” (291.)  
51“Der letzte Mensch”, usually translated as the “last man” or the “last race”, actually: „the last human“, in 
Also Sprach Zarathustra, Vorrede 5 (preface 5).  
52 We will return to this in the next chapter.
53“Wie man wird, was man ist” (how one becomes what one is), in the original by Pindar, is the subtitle to Ecce  
Homo.   
54Cf. D\G 2003, 288: “absolute imperceptibility”. 
one’s proximities and zones of indiscernibility”55. Nietzsche's Zarathustra immediately smells 
necrophilia – Christian morals – in such approximations and shortcuts: 
“Those in more distance are the ones who pay your love to the next of kin [Nächsten];  
and always when you get together as five, a sixth must have died already.”56 
Consequentially, Nietzsche’s becoming goes beyond the internalisations of “love thy 
neighbour” (Nächsten-liebe). Those without self, the self-less (Selbst-lose57) may like to 
“reduce oneself”58, as D\G propose, to the point where “[n]othing develops”59 but 
“everything reconnects”60. Nietzsche, by contrast, could never celebrate “dying happily, 
being extinguished”61. Rather, Nietzschean becoming who one is becomes a pathos of 
distance, thereby rejecting all “process of elimination, [where] one is no longer anything 
more than an abstract line, or a piece in a puzzle that is itself abstract.”62 Indeed, Nietzsche's 
affirmation of life is directed first and foremost against such philosophical abstraction. His 
affirmation affirms singular bodies full of self, or concrete transcendences. Nietzsche's 
becoming, thus, is becoming-critique or able to judge (κριτική) – to judge not only beyond 
transcendental signifiers (Derrida) but also beyond the prisons of immanence. Critical 
becoming or becoming-critical, however, is negating out of affirmation. This is because “[i]f 
we want to live, we need to remember the language of resistance.”63 This is the opposite of 
55Ibid., 280.
56In Also sprach Zarathustra, chapter Von der Nächstenliebe (“About brotherly love“).
57Nietzsche explicitly talks against self-loss (Selbst-Losigkeit) ibid., chapter Von den Tugendhaften (“About the 
virtuous“).  
58D\G 2003, 280.
59Ibid., 266.
60283.
61299.
62280.
63Penny 2010, 66. 
post-critical language. It is a language of distance in time and in space, towards the future 
and the remote. For Nietzschean ethics is brimming not with nepotism but with a love for 
the stranger, the alien and the out-sider beyond immanence. Embodied concrete 
transcendences go not only beyond family, state and their apparatuses; they transcend 
everything that puts pressure on singularities, whether it is constituting itself as herd, pack, 
ingroup, nation, property, market or capital. 
In the last chapter, we will come back to the critical potential of D\G, to their an-archic 
stance of non-fitting, resisting, surmounting. For now, we are equipped with a Nietzschean 
ethics and thus able to criticise D\G.'s undifferentiated, affirmative, abstract plane of 
immanence more concretely. The Internet's “Cosmos as an abstract machine”64 will serve as 
a real-life example through which the notion of the plane of immanence can be 
problematised. Indeed, its “cosmic formula” has as “the immanent end of becoming”65 
imperceptible control – imperceptible since it is “secret by transparency.”66 The next chapter, 
thus, makes clear why Foucault was right when he claimed that the next century would be 
Deleuzian.67 Whereas the 21st century most definitely did not become an-archic, decade-long 
neoliberal deregulations made it anarcho-capitalist in unprecedented ways.   
64D\G 2003, 280.
65Ibid., 279.
66D\G 2003, 290, our italics; cf. Han, 2012.
67 Buchanan 1999. 
III.
The Internet, Avant-gardism, Fascism:
Re-writings of D\G with Tafuri and Nietzsche
“We are facing the emergence of a real, collective madness reinforced by the synchronization  
of emotions: the sudden globalization of affects in real time that hits all of humanity at the  
same time, and in the name of Progress.”68 
The Internet is the latest large-scale technological heir to capitalism’s globalised economy. 
With the Inter-net, a sudden loss of distance and thus simultaneous identification of 
everyone and everything spread over the world, leaving almost no none outside of its reach, 
not even those that have not yet been becoming-fish in the mainstream – and not even the 
peripheries or margins. Indeed, D\G's concepts of becoming are apt tools to adequately 
describe the phenomenon of the Internet. With its inception, the world collapsed into the 
Inter-net's “Planomenon”69, being flattened down to a “planitude”70 of “flat multiplicities”71, 
“defined by” – respectively reduced to – “longitude and latitude, […] speeds and affects”72. 
Therein, everyone is “governed by another”73 “made of refrains”74, all together flowing into 
the “univocality”75 of the “universal machinism”76 which  proclaims: “I am legion.”77 Within 
68Virilio 2012, 75.
69D\G 2003, 252.
70Ibid., 267.
71251.
72262, our italics.
73254.
74309.
75266.
76256.
77239.
this truly puritanist immanence of “pure relations”, “pure event”78 and “pure affects”79, 
there is no longer any “becoming in the pure state”80. Rather, only “mutations of an abstract 
machine”81 or bifurcations of neo-positivist one-dimensionality are left.82 
What is mass-produced within this “surveillance capitalism”83 and the all-invading loops of its 
public sphere or agora is first and foremost “a massive organization of the individual 
consciences for the sake of profit”84 – or a self-commodifying “crowd, itself become a 
spectacle”85. In short, what is mass-produced in the Internet is the perfection of Nietzsche’s 
letzter Mensch. He described him accordingly as part of a society with “no herdsman but one 
herd!”, within which “everyone wants the same, everyone is the same” 86 – this is, a 
commodity (so could be said). Is this what gets affirmed by D\G when they vote for “being 
just like everybody else”87? In any case, Nietzsche's pathos of distance expressed an organic 
growth into height, overcoming and its outsides – not a machinic (economic) growth into 
flatness, reptetition, and immanence. In the chapter against der letzte Mensch, Zarathustra 
speaks against all false post-humanism: 
78263.
79281.
80296.
81307.
82For the concept of “one-dimensionality”, see Marcuse 2002.
83Zuboff 2015.
84Vandenberghe 2008, 893, and Stiegler 2004.   
85Tafuri 1976, 83.
86See Nietzsche’s Also sprach Zarathustra, Vorrede 5 („Preface 5“).   
87D\G 2003, 279.
“It is time that humans plant the seed of their highest hope. Still, the soil is rich enough 
for that. But this soil will one day be poor and docile, and no high tree will longer know 
how to grow from it.”88 
Indeed, this Nietzschean tree is a singular tree, a vote for singularity, an embodiment of 
transcendence. It is a hope for humans, not for cyborgs. 
Yet, what meanwhile “happens at once”89 and “freely on the surface”90 is the progressing 
petty(cy)bourgeoisification of the world population. As usually, capital’s micro-technologies 
were hurrying ahead of capitalism, programming new modes of subjectification before the 
macro-system even thought it could need them. In Tafuri’s anticipating words, through “the 
creation of ‘microenvironments’, the explosive contradictions of the metropolitan 
structures, sublimated and subjected to a cathartic irony, enter into private life.”91 The 
Internet's hyper-urbanist function could not be grasped better than in this analysis avant la 
lettre. 
Hence, were D\G vanguard ideologues of digital capitalism and of the last human? Were 
they continental philosophers of Silicon Valley's “Californian ideology”?92 Were they really 
developing a “Pop Philosophy”93 of “Californiacation” (Red Hot Chili Peppers)? Were they 
even reducible to being part of the community of “lava lamp saint[s] of ‘California 
88Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, Vorrede 5; and the chapter Vom Baum am Berge (“About the tree at the 
mountain”).
89D\G 2003, 297.
90Ibid., 269.
91Tafuri 1976, 142. The metropolitan for Tafuri is „the city as a programed network of communications”, ibid., 
169. “It is not just by chance that the metropolis, the place of absolute alienation, is at the very center of 
concern of the avant-garde”, 1.  
92 Cf. Barbrook/ Cameron 1996.
93Introduction of Anti-Oedipus by Mark Seem, D\G 2012, 7. 
Buddhism’”94? Were they really hyping Californian ideology on both of its ends: mass and 
swarm media, the cinema with all its techniques95 (Hollywood) and the techno-gurus’ 
fantasies of omnipotence (Silicon Valley)?96 
More than that, is it possible that they themselves were technophile gurus of a proto-
neoliberal ontology of deregulated, precariously instable flows? Are they following in that 
the avant-garde of the early 20th century which, as Manfredo Tafuri outlined, “was dedicated 
to an ideology of permanent and programmed innovation”97? Aren’t D\G “teaching that one 
is not to ‘suffer’ that shock, but to absorb it as an inevitable condition of existence”?98 Aren’t 
they teaching precisely “decomposition of complex into elementary forms”99, “ambiguity 
raised to an institution”100, “the sublimation of automatism”101, and “Dadaist 
mechanicalism”102? Is their “Mechanosphere”103 not a “process of consumption [that] tends 
to the infinite”104, namely to an “ensemble of tautological relationships that refer to 
themselves in a maximum of ‘negative enthropy’”105? Were they, in short, just victims of the 
most unleashed cutting-edge spirits of the latest capitalism?
94Culp 2016, 7. 
95Cf. Deleuze 1986. 
96Sometimes, D\G indeed sound a bit like other drug- and techno-gurus of ‘68, especially in imperatives like 
“this is how we need to feel” (263): “Do not imitate a dog” (274).
97Tafuri 1976, 146. In fact, one could write a whole essay criticising D\G.’s avant-gardist moves with Tafuri – 
although Architecture and Utopia was written years before A Thousand Plateaus.
98Ibid, 86
9995. 
100163.
10193.
10274.
103D\G 2003, 252
104Tafuri 1976, 137.
105Ibid., 161.
Undeniably, Tafuri's words sound familiar to those acquainted with D\G.’s philosophy of flat 
infinities on a monist plane of acceleration that, arguably, imprisons becoming in 
immanence. And certainly, D\G “convinced” – as Tafuri writes about the avant-gardes – a 
not too small “public” “that this chaos” of reality under capitalism “contains an unexplored 
richness, unlimited utilizable possibilities, and qualities of the ‘game’ now made into new 
fetishes for society.”106 Even more, D\G.'s functionalism does propagate that “‘criticism of 
conservative thought’ thus becomes a necessity, an instrument for liberating the dynamic 
functioning of the system.”107 Last but not least, D\G describe themselves not only with the 
help of 20th-century avant-gardes but impersonate the theoretical avant-gardes of their 
time.108 
Facing such resemblance between D\G and what Tafuri criticises in capital's avant-gardist 
culture, it seems we have to return to the question of how D\G conceptualise becoming. On 
the one hand, there is the highly critical trans-historical triple-anarchic philosophy of 
becoming developed in chapter I, embracing singularity and the new (beyond the 
Establishment). On the other hand, there is  the “technological utopia”109 of a productivist, 
functionalist, machinistic cosmos accelerating everything into the “absolute movement”110 of 
“Celerity against gravity.”111 In this second technophile if not technocratic version, D\G 
106Ibid., 139. 
10753. 
108Literally, they were theoretical action painters/ performance artists of a kind of vitalist-virtualist Fluxus 
which Guattari proclaimed with the words: “From now on what will be on the agenda is a ‘futurist’ and 
‘constructivist’ opening up of the fields of virtuality.” Guattari 2014, 25. Cf. also Constantin V. Boundas on 
Deleuze-Bergson: An Ontology of the Virtual in Patton 1997.
109Tafuri 1976, 153: “The only utopia the art of the avant-garde was able to proffer was the technological 
utopia.”
110D\G 2003, 255
111Ibid., 289
transform even the subconscious into a machine désirante112 liquidated between a 
microphysics of particles113 and its technological devices. In turn, conscious actors are 
transformed into last humans “that cease to be subjects to become events.”114 The Internet 
as a techno-cosmos thus is a “composition of speed and affects”115 whose mathematised116, 
diagrammed, quantified “maximum number”117 is ruled by a division of responsibilities.118 It 
stages all-adjustable affect-“elements”119 or abstracted identities, an “assemblage of humans 
and their machines” that, as Tiziana Terranova has it, become “updateable equipment.”120 In 
other words, what becomes on the plane of immanence is a “swarm of mosquitoes”121, since 
“the reign of birds seems to have been replaced by the age of insects.”122 If this post-
Nietzschean trans-humanist becoming mediated by the swarm technology of the Internet 
would be all there is in D\G, it would be hard to see them not as technophile gurus of 
Californian ideology.    
Fortunately, however, D\G themselves detect a “danger” in the insects' or swarm's musical 
composition – a danger “veering toward destruction”123. In fact, they even give this danger 
the rather unambivalent name fascism.124 With a “certain blindness to the erroneousness of 
112Cf. D\G 2013, 11-68.
113Cf. ibid., 561-572.
114D\G 2003, 262
115Ibid., 258.
116D\G 2003, 307: “one can only calculate  […] powers of deterritorialization”; and “count […] affects”, 257. 
117Ibid., 265.
118Cf. Arendt 2006.
119Cf. 256.
120Terranova, 2004. 
121D\G 2003, 245.
122Ibid., 308.
123299.
124Cf. in more detail D\G 2013, 243-270. Since “the refrain itself is the content of music”, “[m]usic has a thirst 
for destruction”, which is “its potential ‘fascism’.” (D\G 2003, 299.)
dividing the Real into a number of discrete domains”125 displayed by digital capital and its 
assemblages, “the creative line, or line of flight immediately turns into a line of death and 
abolition.”126 For fascism is not only Nazism, it is not even mainly about the personal leader, 
the static state, strict hierarchies, nor about fear, obedience or recoding, but rather about 
the libidinal immersion in a “violence of affects.”127 In short, D\G conceive of fascism as the 
violence of (axiomatically) flowing affective fasci or “molecular proximit[ies]”128 whose 
futurist “affects circulate”129 like machinic insects. As a result, the mosquitoes' moving 
swarm composes a “music” that “draws people and armies into a race that can go all the 
way to the abyss.”130 Indeed, this abyss is the dead end we spoke about at the end of the 
first chapter. It is a dead end in which certain lines of flight may blindly end up if not directed 
by singularity, self-rule, or self-differentiation.
Yet, there is an alternative to this cosmos of “philofolly”, to the globalised immaterial 
“hyper-fascism”131 of letzte Menschen as molecular microfascists132. There is an alternative to 
the proto-neoliberal ontology of precariously instable flows on a technocratic plane of 
immanence. There is an alternative to the anatomisation of psyches or to augmented 
swarm-identities which are organised in musical compositions. The alternative to D\G.'s 
“three virtues” of “imperceptibility, indiscernibility, and impersonality”133 are the three 
anarchies we developed in chapter I. These three anarchies are also the alternative to the 
125Guattari 2014, 27.
126D\G 2003, 285. Cf. also Peters 2006. 
127D\G 2003, 269.
128Ibid., 274.
129257.
130302.
131Virilio 2012, 76. 
132Cf. D\G 2013, 251.
133D\G 2003, 280.
unholy trinity Internet, avant-gardism, fascism which we approached in the present chapter. 
Meanwhile, the three an-archies κρίσις, κριτικός, κρίνειν can be delineaed more clearly. As 
in chapter II, Nietzsche will be of help to do so – this time with his concept of becoming 
being called the “child”. 
This “child” is not a surrendered immediacy of indiscriminately becoming-anything – it is not 
stuck before the mirror stage. Rather, it is the critical and consciously self-affirmative 
judging child of “becoming who one is”. Thus, Nietzsche’s child is full of the joy of itself, 
critical because it is affirmative and affirmative because it is critical, and both due to its great 
“yes” towards life and its embodiment. Indeed, for Nietzsche, becoming-child includes a 
twofold becoming-animal: becoming-camel and becoming-lion. In this “triolectics” (Asger 
Jorn), we can discover our three an-archies. The child's große Gesundheit entails both the 
suffering-enduring camel (κρίσις) and the critically negative lion (κριτικός). Indeed, they 
meet – when grown up – exactly in the child (κρίνειν) as self-differentiation.134 This child's 
ethos is a pathos of distance that loves the most what is most remote – what is outside of 
immanence. Hence, Nietzsche's child is becoming-overcoming: transcending first and 
foremost the tyranny of proximities. Its an-archic triolectics consists of κρίσις (camel), 
κριτικός (lion) and κρίνειν (child), which all are expressions of the affirmation of life. The 
triolectic child is the singularity, self-rule or self-differentiation in which suffering, critique 
and affirmation are united.       
134Cf. Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, chapter Von den drei Verwandlungen („About the three 
metamorphoses“).
IV.
Re-writings of D\G/N with Kafka ( D\G/N+K):
The Barbaric Plane of Transcendence 
The time has come to read and re-write D\G and Nietzsche (D\G/N) alongside each other 
and beyond each as an an-archic co-operation between friends of life and becoming. Taking 
an-archy seriously in this manner, what has to be overcome are not only states and the 
status quo (of market, capital and technology) but also the bourgeois theodicy of the “state 
of nature” and the “nature of human beings”. The west inherited these entities of the 
theodicy from the nihilist (Christian) hatred of the earth and the body. That same hatred was 
christened “original sin” and got successively a) secularised and thereby brought back into 
the centre of realpolitik by Machiavelli and Hobbes; b) naturalised by the survival of the 
fittest Darwin; c) materialised by economics and economic expansion, making it empirical. 
Last but not least, “original sin” as the “state of nature” got d) fatalised by the son of a 
priest, late Friedrich Nietzsche. Via his lovely return to the metaphysics of the eternal called 
amor fati, the very timely invention of the will to power could also be proclaimed – not to 
speak of its infamous caricature in the “blonde beast”135. 
Unfortunately, D\G don’t seem to be too critical precisely about this repression if not 
neurotic psychologisation of the old narrative that tells us the bellicist story of arché – of 
nature beginning with the end of paradise, or with the fall of man. Ever since, there are only 
two choices in nature, also for D\G: “either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it”136. 
This secularised, naturalised, materialised, fatalised version of the original sin as evil nature 
equals a race to the bottom or rather into the above-mentioned abyss that “no character or 
135Cf. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, book 1, § 11. 
136D\ G 2003, 257.
subject will survive” 137. Of course, under capitalism, the race to the abyss bears the name 
competition, which is a survival of the fittest disciplining everyone into adjustment. The 
bottom line of competition as a war of all against all (Marx), however, is well known: “from 
time immemorial ‘nature’ has been at war with life!”138 So is the eco-philosopher's opinion 
on the subject. It is interesting to reconstruct how the secularisation of the original sin as evil 
nature debunks itself already in its father-figure, Thomas Hobbes. First, nature needed to be 
declared to be a State as well, so that the “state of nature” could also become a 
warmongering totality. In the following, the Hobbesian State of (human) nature as a 
warmongering totality needed to be projected as the “solution” – the Leviathan – back onto 
the beginning of times (ἀρχή) as a kind of law of life, yet without omitting to remain the 
original problem (war of all against all). In short, it uses ἀρχή as a circular argument to 
universalise the eternal power-game. In this way, markets' competition becomes 
naturalised, and states' sovereignty gets civilised. Hence, an-archy beyond power becomes 
both unnatural (non-market) and uncivilised (non-state).139
At the latest from then on, even animals are ideologically instrumentalised and /wolves/ are 
supposed to be against wolves, legible – still in D\G – as the “becomings-animal” of “the man 
of war.”140 Such affiliating, however, bring D\G back to the very contemporary of Hobbes 
they probably disliked the most – this is, to Descartes. Whilst the latter’s rationalism, 
proclaimed during mercantilist times of progressions in the exploitation of nature and the 
colonies, declared the body of animals to be a machinic functioning (Bête machine), D\G.’s 
ir- or hyper-rationalism regards not only some species in this way but whole nature. Or, in 
137Ibid., 269.
138Guattari 2014, 45.
139This reading got most of its background from MacPherson 1970. 
140D\G 2003, 278.
their own words, “The plane of the consistency of Nature is like an immense Abstract 
Machine.”141 Thereby animals, nature and life are all reduced into the pseudo-neutrality of 
technology, and technology in turn gets naturalised. Together, they form a cyborg-like war 
machine of the Hobbesian nature-state, starting from the fall of man and – consequentially – 
accelerating into the abyss. Indeed, this is the very opposite of an-archy.   
Yet, becoming-animal does not equal becoming-machine. Now preferring D\G.’s vermin, 
plague and contagion to Nietzsche’s master race (Herrenmensch), it must generally be 
stated that animals are neither machines nor packs, neither Hobbesian wolves nor Freudian 
wolves in sheep’s clothing. Rather, they are body-beings and thus vulnerabilities, as all living 
becomings are. Inasmuch as potency without sensitivity is not becoming but sterile-virile 
aggression, D\G.’s “contaminating men”142 should be embraced as an affirmation of bare 
life.143 Such bare life is beyond any affiliation with the power-Polis, this is beyond all 
“Nietzschean” (Greek) demos- and domestication that define “man” either as a being 
capable of talking or as a political animal. In fact, bare life precisely is speechless, it is 
βάρβαροι (barbarians), a multitude of (unintelligible) outsiders.144 Bare life is outside of the 
gates of the power-Polis, it is outside of political immanence – it gathers itself on the 
barbarian plane of transcendence. By embracing bare life, D\G/N would refute the political 
(anti-barbarian) philosophers from Plato to Hegel with their bad taste in music – namely 
their endless refrains of “totality was there before the particular”, “society was there before 
the individual”, etc. For bare life remains barbarian, and its music remains unintelligible to 
civilised ears. Yet, how to bring the “anti-compassion” philosopher of music and power – 
141Ibid., 254.
142D\G 2003, 276.
143Cf. Agamben 1998.
144Cf. Rancière 2005.
Nietzsche – in line with an embrace of bare life? How to bring him in line with an embrace of 
the weak, the wormy, the vulnerable? 
Here, it is fruitful to re-read Nietzsche’s attitude towards compassion and pity from scratch. 
This re-reading will make it fit with Nietzsche the “Schizo”; and with Nietzsche’s often 
described actually hyper-sensitive character outside of his official writings.145 Since his 
collapse in front of the tortured horse in Turin, Nietzsche, as Milan Kundera puts it, “was 
trying to apologize to the horse for Descartes.”146 Arguably, then and there, he whole-
heartedly embraced radical vulnerability and thus broke free from his eternal return of 
mercilessness, letting in the singular as the most minoritarian. For in front of the other as 
singularity and vulnerability, a becoming-humble happens forcing us to apologise and to 
admit, as D\G do, that “[t]here is always a perception finer than yours, a perception of your 
imperceptible.”147 
It was Franz Kafka who described this becoming-humble in front of the singular other and its 
profound affirmation in most beautiful lines: 
“When you stand in front of me and look at me, what do you know about the pain that is 
in me, and what do I know about yours. And if I prostrated before you and cried and told 
you, what more would you know about me than about hell when someone tells you, it is 
hot and horrible. Already therefore, we humans should stand in front of each other as 
reverent, as thoughtful as in front of the entrance to hell.”148 
145Cf. Wieke 2008.
146Milan Kundera in The Unbearable Lightness of Being, quoted by Townsend 2017. 
147D\G 2003, 287.
148Our translation and italics. From a letter by Kafka to Oskar Pollak (8th November 1903), http://franz-
kafka.eu/zitate/, accessed 7/1/18.  
For indeed, there is hell, and there are possibilities of entering and leaving it. Kafka’s 
becomings-animal are not musical compositions between two political animals, barbaric 
breakdowns of the power-Polis and of its entrances and entrance fees, not only 
micropolitical be-tweens149 but barbaric be-yonds: tries and trials beyond hell. Compassion 
may be a sin in the naturalised fall of man into the abyss – but it is a virtue if seen from the 
angle of singularity, of self-rule and self-differentiation. Nietzsche the Schizo was the 
Nietzsche within his last ten years, the years after becoming-humble and apologising in front 
of the horse in Turin. And in fact, this sensitive, compassionate, perhaps even regretting 
Nietzsche was more affirmative towards life and its beings than the late official version of 
Nietzsche, than the pitiless Herrenmensch of will to power, of “non, je ne regrette rien” 
(Édith Piaf).   
Yet, here, we seem to encounter D\G.’s incapacity to think being150 – being that nevertheless 
pre-conditions becoming. A philosophy that remains merely philosophical and thinks of such 
a “pre-condition” as being being “western philosophy” or a hierarchy to get rid of remains 
precisely within the west – namely blind against its own remaining in the power-Polis. This is 
so because only the non-philosophic un-intelligibilised barbarian – whose singular life as 
vulnerable body is not protected from Leviathans – has experienced that all becoming in fact 
needs being, first and foremost, is being. Every contrary opinion is the liberalism of civilians 
demanding civil rights instead of transcending the judicial sphere into becoming-overcoming. 
Such becoming-overcoming would be an an-archic stepping outside the power-Polis into 
mutual aid and cooperation. A life, as long as it is not abstracted from itself and thus made 
into “the life”, “life” or “lives” (but grasped concretely) is not amorphous, not 
149Cf. D\G 2003, 246 and 293 ff.; 277: “The only way to get outside the dualisms is to be-between, to pass 
between, the intermezzo.”
150Cf. f.e. the symptomatic, formerly criticised, here re-used structuralist notion of D\G: “There are only 
relations of movement and rest”, ibid. 266.
undifferentiated or augmented or no-body. Rather, it is embodied self-differentiating: a life 
is critical. It is a body that is as vulnerable as it is exactly because it is, because it is a being, 
one singular (non-essentialist) becoming living being.151  
V.
Concluding Remarks Beyond Post-Critique:
Ways of Reconciling Critique and Affirmation, Transcendence and Immanence
We have tried to demonstrate: from becoming-humble follows becoming-critical; from the 
affirmation of life follows the critique of what is murderous; from embracing the earth 
follows to transcend the plane of (political) immanence. Since being is threatened, becoming 
becomes overcoming: becomes – also – negative: resistant, dissident, critical. In short, 
differentiated affirmation and differentiating critique can only be reconciled beyond “post-
critique”. Indeed, the essay argued that critique even needs to become more radical. This is 
the case because there are (family) Trees whose roots (radices) should be uprooted – for the 
Tree's amplified crown is not the absence of ruling but its omni-presence (I). The immersion 
in an ontology of deregulated flows is not an-archic but belongs to anarcho-capitalism (III). 
Against it, we have attempted to excavate another trace in D\G: that of the three anarchies 
of κρίσις, κριτικός, κρίνειν (II). Within them, suffering, negating and self-differentiating unite. 
Such critique is the opposite of ressentiment: it is the most thorough (self-)affirmation of life 
emblematised in Nietzsche's triolectic child (IV).  
151As such, a life always is this life. See Hägglund 2020.
On this path, D\G as an-archists became-critical of machinism, economism and war – 
especially of “the machines of human beings, the roar of factories and bombers.”152 Also, the 
dangers of fascism and “Integrated World Capitalism”153 became-perceivable as abysses in 
which blind lines of flight may end up as well. Only critical singularity – self-rule and self-
differentiation – can catch this fall of wo*man. And indeed, beyond post-critical endeavours, 
D\G propose critical singularity as self-rule and self-differentiation. In their opinion, there 
has to be “the expansion of alternative experiences centred around a respect for singularity, 
and through the continuous production of an autonomizing subjectivity that can articulate 
itself appropriately in relation to the rest of society.”154 Yet, the expansion of a respect for 
singularity through autonomising subjectivities is conditional on singular living beings' critical 
self-differentiation – which, in turn, is vulnerable. This means that becoming-singular is 
conditional on others being sensitive. Consequentially, sensitivity is first and foremost 
respect for “the singular, the exceptional, the rare”155. And the other way around: respect is 
embedded in sensitive singularity as a “secret”156 whose “content is too big for its form.”157 In 
this sense, D\G/N may not find together in the pathos of distance – but perhaps in the love 
for the concrete transcendence of irreducibly embodied singularity.158 In any case, on the 
path proposed to be taken in the present essay, it would be ridiculous to claim D\G were 
trans-/anti-/post-critical – or without any outside, negativity or beyond. Arguably, 
nomadology is about nothing else. On the other hand, to get to this conclusion, we needed 
152309.
153Cf. Guattari 2014.
154Ibid. 40, our italics.
15534.
156Cf. D\G 2003, 286 ff.  
157Ibid., 286.
158Cf. footnote 51 above. 
to find some lines of flight beyond D\G's affirmative immanence – for the sake of their three 
anarchies. The Geistergespräche with Nietzsche (N), Tafuri (T) and Kafka (K) were important 
contaminations of D\G whose result is D\G/N+T+K. The result are three anarchies beyond 
uncritical affirmation. 
Yet, arguably, already D\G's plane of consistency is less the monist ontologisation of the 
world as it is than an alternative to it if not a utopia or a “faith”159 in something outside of it 
– transcending the merely empirical or (neo-)positivist. In a way, D\G's whole style even 
attempts to draw the impossibility of a completely abstract picture of escape routes. In this 
picture, the systematic grand paradox of the “abstract line”160 multiplies into the deviant 
“line of flight towards a future that remains unpredictable”161. On this path, liberation itself 
is embraced as the emancipation of, not from “outside coordinates”162. In sum, D\G “free the 
line, free the diagonal”163 – this is what happens between D and G. Their overcoming 
diagonal (\) escapes also the Trees' horizontal bifurcations of flatness, and its escape route 
can be read as a utopian one. Along this line, transcendence becomes immanent in D\G.'s 
rhizomatic planes: since becoming has no topos, u-topos or becoming-utopian is its elective 
affinity. 
As a result, the reconciliation of affirmation and critique is also a reconciliation of 
immanence and transcendence – the reconciliation of an anti-theological down-to-earth-
attitude with a this-worldly utopian stance. Becoming, therein, is becoming-critical: 
differentiating enough to see that to affirm life, a lot of real negation, negation happening 
159D\G 2003, 282.
160Ibid., 277, our italics; cf. also 298.
161Manola Antonioli cited in Dosse 2011, 509. 
162D\G 2003, 297.
163Ibid., 295.
outside of the ivory tower (in the “real world”), is to be criticised. By contrast, under neo-
technocratic hypercapitalism, post-critique becomes-ressentiment against utopia, if not a 
straightforward negation of life. After all, without transcendent critique – without “heaven 
on earth” – earth becomes hell: inaffirmable. Beyond such inaffirmability, D\G.'s abstract 
picture of lines of flight is a critical yet this-worldly utopian vision. 
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Appendix with longer original quotes
Footnote 22: „Hitler als politisches Genie war eine riesenhafte Entlarvung des Wesens der Politik 
überhaupt. Mit Hitler hat die Politik ihre höchste Entwicklung erreicht.“ – W. Reich.  
Footnote 57: „Die Ferneren sind es, welche eure Liebe zum Nächsten bezahlen; und schon wenn ihr  
zu fünfen miteinander seid, muß immer ein sechster sterben.“ – F. Nietzsche.
Footnote 87: „Kein Hirt und Eine Heerde! Jeder will das Gleiche, Jeder ist gleich: wer anders fühlt,  
geht freiwillig in's Irrenhaus.“ – F. Nietzsche.
Footnote 89: „Es ist an der Zeit, dass der Mensch den Keim seiner höchsten Hoffnung pflanze. Noch 
ist sein Boden dazu reich genug. Aber dieser Boden wird einst arm und zahm sein, und kein hoher 
Baum wird mehr aus ihm wachsen können.“ – F. Nietzsche.
Footnote 149: „Wenn Du vor mir stehst und mich ansiehst, was weißt Du von den Schmerzen, die in 
mir sind und was weiß ich von den Deinen. Und wenn ich mich vor Dir niederwerfen würde und 
weinen und erzählen, was wüßtest Du von mir mehr als von der Hölle, wenn Dir jemand erzählt, sie 
ist  heiß  und  fürchterlich.  Schon  darum  sollten  wir  Menschen  vor  einander  so  ehrfürchtig,  so  
nachdenklich, so liebend stehn wie vor dem Eingang zur Hölle.“ – F. Kafka.
